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PREJUDICE vs. PROBATIVE VALUE, PHILADELPHIA STYLE 
MICHAEL AVERY* 
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that relevant evidence 
may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.”1  Rule 403 cuts across all of the other rules of 
evidence and is one of the most frequently invoked rules during trials.  
Teaching the various concepts that come into play in applying this rule poses 
several challenges, and many students have substantial difficulty in 
understanding what constitutes “unfair prejudice.” 
For the first class on Rule 403, I assign some practical problems from the 
textbook2 and the case of Old Chief v. United States.3  To get things started, I 
sometimes show students a series of photographs that might be offered to 
illustrate the testimony of a forensic pathologist in a murder case.  This 
provides a relatively straightforward opportunity to assess the probative value 
of the pictures in establishing, for example, the cause or manner of death, or 
whether the murder was premeditated or committed with extreme atrocity and 
cruelty, and to weigh that against the risk of prejudice that might result from an 
emotional response to gruesome images.4  This is also a good time to introduce 
the idea that Rule 403 decisions are within the discretion of the trial judge and 
are seldom reversed on appeal.5 
It is much more instructive to show students actual photographs than to 
rely on the descriptions of photographs in appellate court opinions.  At trial a 
prosecutor cannot adequately explain how the pathologist came to the 
conclusion that a gun was fired from within two feet of the deceased without 
showing a photograph of the entrance wound and the stippling on the skin 
 
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston, MA; B.A. Yale College and LL.B. 
Yale Law School. 
 1. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 2. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE (2002). 
 3. 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 4. For an illustrative collection of cases, see PAUL J. LIACOS, MARK S. BRODIN & 
MICHAEL AVERY, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE § 11.6 (7th ed. 1999). 
 5. Most of the casebooks that I have reviewed include an appellate case where a conviction 
was reversed because photographs were more prejudicial than probative.  In reality, however, 
such decisions are rare and it is necessary to advise students that if the defense lawyer cannot 
convince the trial judge to exclude such photographs, the chances of winning the issue on appeal 
are remote. 
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surface.  It is no less difficult for a professor to talk about the probative value 
of such a photo without showing it.  Similarly, it is impossible to convey the 
risk of prejudice inherent in viewing autopsy photos (or their potential 
probative value) without actually showing them in the classroom.  Because 
these images will be disturbing to many students, I warn them in the preceding 
class that such pictures are coming. 
After a discussion of the photographs, I then show a brief scene from the 
movie Philadelphia6 in order to introduce greater complexity and to more fully 
explore the nuanced questions that arise under Rule 403.  In the film, Andrew 
Beckett (played by Tom Hanks) is a lawyer with AIDS who sues his former 
law firm for discriminating against him because of his illness.  One of the 
plaintiff’s claims is that he was discharged because the partners believed that 
his physical appearance and what it implied were not good for the firm’s 
image. 
In one of the film’s central courtroom scenes, Andrew is on the witness 
stand undergoing cross-examination by the firm’s lawyer, Belinda Conine, 
played by Mary Steenburgen.7  She seeks to illustrate the implausibility of 
Beckett’s claims by means of a courtroom demonstration.  She has Andrew 
repeat his claim that at the time he was discharged he had lesions on his face 
that were visible to the people he worked with.  He confirms that it was his 
opinion that when his partners became aware of the lesions, they leapt to the 
conclusion that he had AIDS and fired him. 
Mary Steenburgen then asks, “Do you have any lesions on your face at this 
time?”  He replies (gesturing), “One, here, by my ear.”  She then walks to the 
edge of the witness box with a large mirror in her hand.  She asks whether he 
can see the lesion on his face in her mirror from three feet away.  The scene is 
shot over the witness’s shoulder, looking at Mary Steenburgen’s face.  As she 
turns the mirror in her hand, Andrew’s face comes into focus in the mirror and 
we see the both of them side by side.  He looks quizzically at the mirror and 
then says haltingly, “Well, at the time I was fired I had four lesions and they 
were much bigger.”  She quickly prompts, “Could you answer the question 
please.”  After a few seconds (during which dramatic music underscores his 
plight), he answers, “No, no I can’t.”  She repeats, “No,” then concludes, “No 
more questions, your Honor.” 
 
 6. PHILADELPHIA (TriStar Pictures 1993) (directed by Jonathan Demme).  Tom Hanks won 
an Oscar for Best Actor in a leading role.  The scene described here occurs approximately one 
hour and thirty-five minutes into the film.  I am indebted to Prof. George Fisher from Stanford 
Law School for originally suggesting this film clip.  Adopters of Prof. Fisher’s book receive a 
very useful videotape of a variety of film clips from several movies for illustrating different rules 
of evidence. 
 7. Except for the protagonist Andrew Beckett, I will refer to the characters by naming the 
actors who played them. 
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Accompanied by more dramatic music, the judge announces that he thinks 
it would be a good time to break for the day and reconvene in the morning.8  
Andrew Beckett’s lawyer is Joe Miller, played by Denzel Washington.  He 
does not want to see the trial recessed on this sorry note and asks the judge for 
five minutes for re-direct.  The judge asks the witness whether he can go on.  
Beckett is downcast, with his head in his hand.  “Three minutes,” suggests the 
plaintiff’s lawyer.  “Yes . . . yes,” says Beckett, surrendering with a wave of 
his hand. 
Denzel Washington is immediately out of his seat, bounding to the defense 
table to ask if he can borrow Mary Steenburgen’s mirror.  She gives it up and 
Beckett’s lawyer charges toward the witness box. 
“Andrew,” he asks, “do you have any lesions on any part of your body at 
this time that resemble the lesions you had on your face at the time that you 
were fired?”  “Yes,” says Andrew, haltingly, “on my tor . . . torso.”  Denzel 
nods, “On your torso.  If it please the Court, I would like to ask Andrew to 
remove his shirt so that, you know, everyone here could get an accurate idea of 
what we’re talking about.” 
“Objection,” from the defense lawyer.  “Your Honor, it would unfairly 
influence the jury.”9 
Denzel replies, “Your Honor, if Andrew was forced to use a wheelchair 
due to his illness, would the defense ask him to park it outside because it 
would unfairly influence the jury?  C’mon, we’re talking about AIDS, we’re 
talking about lesions, let’s see what we’re talking about.” 
The camera pans to the judge, deep in thought.  He rules, “I’ll allow it.  
Mr. Beckett, would you please remove your shirt?” 
The camera returns to Andrew and the music comes back up.  Breathing 
with difficulty, he begins to pull on his necktie.  The camera shifts to the law 
firm partners in the front row.  One mutters, “My God, what a nightmare.”  
The next reassures him, “He asked for it.” 
Andrew now has moved his tie aside and is beginning to unbutton his shirt.  
The jurors appear transfixed by what they are watching, as is my audience of 
students.  After several seconds of difficulty with the buttons, Andrew parts his 
shirt to reveal several large brown lesions on his chest, which we observe in 
the mirror held by his lawyer. 
The lawyer asks, “Andrew, can you see the lesions on your chest in this 
mirror?” “Yes,” says Andrew.  “Thank you,” says Denzel, almost in a whisper.  
Andrew stares defiantly out into the courtroom. 
 
 8. The successful cross-examiner returns to her seat and whispers to her colleague, in a 
resigned tone of voice suggesting that her job requires her to do something distasteful, but 
necessary, “I hate this case.” 
 9. This I treat as an awkwardly worded invocation of Rule 403. 
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I begin the discussion by inviting the students to imagine how “cool” it 
would be, if they were in real trouble and needed a great lawyer, to have 
Denzel handle the case.  I then point out that no matter how well they learn the 
rules of evidence, they will never be able to convince a judge to let them play 
the dramatic music during the key portions of their client’s testimony.10 
We then turn to the legal analysis.  The first question I throw out is 
whether the judge should have sustained Mary Steenburgen’s objection to the 
demonstration.  Sometimes this leads immediately into a discussion of whether 
it was “prejudicial.”  Fairly quickly, however, someone always comments that 
it only seems fair to allow Andrew’s lawyer to show the lesions on his chest 
because the defense lawyer “started it.”  This is an opportunity to talk briefly 
about the practical issues that motivate decisions by judges in “the real world.”  
My experience trying cases11 suggests that the vast majority of judges would 
overrule Mary Steenburgen’s objection on the “fight fire with fire” theory.12  
This is particularly true here, where defense counsel was engaged in a tactical 
gambit that, as we shall see, was itself fundamentally misleading. 
To eliminate that relatively uncomplicated way of resolving the problem, I 
then hypothesize that the plaintiff’s lawyer had asked Andrew to remove his 
shirt and demonstrate the lesions during the direct examination.  I ask whether 
that would have been objectionable and several students invariably, and 
quickly, opine that it would have been “prejudicial.”  I encourage the students 
to explain what they mean by “prejudicial.” 
It is best to let the discussion continue for some time before the teacher 
intervenes again.  Several students will describe the prejudice as resulting from 
the fact that the demonstration has had a devastating impact on the jury.  Over 
and over again students will make the mistake of thinking that evidence, which 
damages the party against whom it is offered, is prejudicial.  It is difficult to 
overcome the very common misconception held by students who are just 
beginning to study evidence that evidence is prejudicial when it is powerful 
and strikes a hard blow.  Many students will suffer from this misunderstanding 
 
 10. Although the music is a Hollywood touch, when we later discuss whether the plaintiff 
should have been required to show a photograph rather than removing his shirt in the courtroom, 
the issue of to what extent drama is permissible becomes important. 
 11. Before beginning to teach at Suffolk, the Author was a trial lawyer for twenty-eight 
years, handling for the most part civil rights and criminal defense cases. 
 12. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 177, n.2  (1988) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (soundness of admitting evidence to which otherwise there would be a valid objection 
on the ground that the objecting party has “open[ed] the door” and the opponent is merely 
“fighting fire with fire” “depends on the specific situation in which it is used and calls for an 
exercise of judicial discretion”); Bearint ex rel. Bearint v. Dorel Juvenile Group, 389 F.3d 1339, 
1349 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing the doctrine, also known as “curative admissibility,” and 
noting that “the extent to which otherwise inadmissible evidence is permitted must correspond to 
the unfair prejudice created”). 
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through several classes and a small minority, unfortunately, all the way 
through the final exam. 
I ask the students for a more detailed answer—what is it that has such a 
strong impact on the jury in this case?  To conduct a proper analysis under 
Rule 403 one has to be able to articulate specifically what constitutes both the 
risk of prejudice and probative value of the evidence.  This is difficult for 
students who have had no experience in marshalling evidence to prove a 
proposition in a courtroom. 
In this case there are a variety of emotions that may be stirred by Andrew’s 
removal of his shirt.  The lesions themselves are disturbing and some jurors 
may be horrified by them.  When the jurors look directly at this physical 
symptom of Andrew’s disease the gravity of his situation becomes palpable in 
a way that nothing else in the trial had evoked.  It is hard not to imagine that 
their hearts go out to him. 
Andrew is dying and his difficulty undoing his buttons and opening his 
shirt, on top of his difficulty in speaking, dramatizes the gradual deterioration 
of his physical condition.  The demonstration of his limitations takes the jurors 
deeper into the reality of his condition.  That the jurors share this everyday task 
that is difficult for Andrew encourages them to identify and sympathize with 
him more than they would on the basis of mere oral testimony about his illness. 
Moreover, the courtroom is a formal setting.  The participants in the trial 
are in business dress.  The fact that Andrew has been forced to partially 
undress in the courtroom is humiliating and his bare chest is shocking. 
This complex situation provides an excellent opportunity to distinguish 
between evidence that is damaging to the opponent and evidence that creates a 
“danger of unfair prejudice.”  The Advisory Committee’s Note defines “unfair 
prejudice” as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”13  The students must 
unravel which of the emotional responses to the demonstration create a danger 
of unfair prejudice in this sense.  This is very difficult given their inexperience. 
Eventually, however, the discussion reveals that arguably the sympathy 
jurors will feel toward the plaintiff as he struggles with his buttons and is 
forced to partially disrobe in the courtroom creates an appeal to emotion that is 
not relevant to the issues in the employment case and hence constitutes unfair 
prejudice.  A demonstration of a plaintiff’s limitations would be relevant in a 
personal injury case against the tortfeasor who caused the injuries.  But 
Andrew Beckett has not claimed that the law firm caused his medical condition 
or aggravated it.  He is suing for compensation for the loss of his job, not his 
health.  And if the hypothetical question involves a demonstration during the 
plaintiff’s case in chief, the defendant law firm has not caused the disrobing. 
 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 403 Advisory Committee’s Note. 
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The jurors’ emotions in response to viewing the lesions, however, are 
another matter.  The plaintiff’s theory is that the partners of the law firm were 
disturbed by the lesions on his face and that his discharge was due to the firm’s 
concern about the emotional impact the lesions might have on clients.  The 
potential for an emotional response to the lesions is a relevant fact in the case.  
Thus it might be argued that showing the lesions to the jury does not create an 
unfair risk of prejudice, but merely exposes the jurors on an emotional level to 
a relevant fact.  This, of course, is an argument that has some limits.  Judges 
would hardly permit a plaintiff to stage a traumatic accident or assault in the 
courtroom in order to allow jurors to experience emotional suffering.  But it is 
important for students to understand that evidence is not necessarily unfairly 
prejudicial just because it evokes an emotional response. 
By this point in the class discussion someone is likely to have pointed out 
that it was not necessary for Andrew to bare his chest in the courtroom for the 
jury to see what the lesions looked like.  Plaintiff could have introduced in 
evidence a photograph of the lesions he had while working at the firm.  If no 
such photo exists, he could take a contemporary picture of the lesions on his 
chest and introduce that.  Someone in the class usually asks whether the court 
could require plaintiff to use a photograph rather than to expose his body.  This 
provides a good opportunity to step away from the film briefly for some 
discussion of Old Chief v. United States. 
In Old Chief, a principal question Justice Souter addresses is whether the 
Rule 403 balancing should be conducted while looking at an item of evidence 
in isolation, or whether a court should make the decision in the full evidentiary 
context of the case.14  In the latter case, a court could take into account 
available substitutes for the evidence to which objection had been made.15  For 
reasons which Justice Souter discusses at length, the Court adopts the latter 
approach. 
Applying Justice Souter’s Old Chief analysis to the option of substituting a 
photograph for the baring of Andrew’s chest in the courtroom requires the 
students to make a careful examination of the issues.  First, there is the 
question of whether the photograph has the same probative value as the live 
display of the lesions.  In this regard, one must consider that ordinarily a party 
is entitled to choose what evidence best proves his case and, in Justice Souter’s 
words, “tells a colorful story with descriptive richness.”16  The students debate 
whether the relatively antiseptic photograph really has the same probative 
value, given the nature of the plaintiff’s allegations, as the live display.  They 
want to know how far one can really go in a courtroom to tell a story in a 
dramatic fashion.  The potential of what trial lawyers might do to engage the 
 
 14. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 175, 180 (1997). 
 15. Id. at 182–83. 
 16. Id. at 187. 
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jurors is fascinating.  There is, of course, no bright line answer for these 
questions. 
If the court were to conclude that the photo has equivalent probative value 
with the display, and offers less of a risk of unfair prejudice (which seems 
fairly clear), then the court should discount the probative value of the live 
display and exclude it if its discounted probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.17  Again there are difficult 
questions which can be debated.  How much of a discount is appropriate and 
how actually does one measure probative value and the risk of prejudice to 
weigh them against each other?  These, of course, are discretionary judgments 
that the trial court must make, and this means there will be very few reversals 
of such decisions on appeal.  The discussion, however, of how the trial judge 
should rule is an opportunity for students to get a feel for how lawyers use 
different types of evidence to influence jurors and to think about how jurors 
might actually react to the alternative methods of proof in this case. 
Finally, I return to the case as the film presented it and raise the question of 
whether what Mary Steenburgen did should have been allowed if Andrew’s 
lawyer had objected.  The point here is that what the defense lawyer did was 
arguably unfair and misleading because there was no evidence that the 
circumstances of the courtroom demonstration were substantially similar to the 
actual facts of the case.18  In fact, the only evidence on point suggests that the 
opposite is true, because Andrew testified that there were more lesions on his 
face at the time he was fired and they were “much bigger.”  The judge would 
have to make a determination as to whether the differences between the lesions 
at the time Andrew was fired and the one that existed at trial were significant 
enough to exclude the demonstration, or whether the differences, once 
explained, only went to the weight of the evidence. 
The discussion of the film, as suggested above, does not completely 
resolve the students’ confusion and uncertainties about prejudice and probative 
value.  It does, however, provide an interesting and enjoyable vehicle for 
introducing some of the principal issues that arise under Rule 403.  Moreover, 
it provides an opportunity to discuss theoretical issues in the context of how 
trial lawyers actually work in the courtroom.  Given that most law students 
have little or no experience in courtrooms, film clips such as this can be an 
important tool in teaching the rules of evidence. 
 
 17. Id. at 183. 
 18. See, e.g., Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d 1226, 1233–34 (8th Cir. 1982) (citations 
omitted) (“A court may properly admit experimental evidence if the tests were conducted under 
conditions substantially similar to the actual conditions.  Admissibility, however, does not depend 
on perfect identity between actual and experimental conditions.  Ordinarily, dissimilarities affect 
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.”). 
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